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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

KEEPING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE CHALLENGE OF
COMPLEXITY, REPUTATION, AND SUPPLY CHAIN CRISES

Supply chains are developed to reduce business expenses and increase
efficiency. However, a disruption in the supply chain, or a failure in one of the
links, can expose organizations to crises that can severely impact short-term bottom
line and long-term corporate reputation. This study examines the communication
challenges inherent in supply chain crises using Samsung’s 2016 Galaxy Note 7
phone crisis as a case study. Results of this study show, in a supply chain crisis,
stakeholders hold the organization responsible, regardless of where in the supply
chain the break occurred. This study also examines the impact of complexity
inherent to supply chain crises and the challenges organizations face during a crisis
when organizational reputation is impacted by links in the supply chain outside the
organization’s direct control.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Current business trends show growing reliance on supply chains to meet consumer
demands (Natarajarathinam, Capar, & Narayanan, 2009). While supply chains reduce
lead-time and inventory costs, they also open organizations to risk, as direct control is
lost over product manufacturing and outcomes (Campi, 2013). Reliance on supply chains
make businesses more vulnerable to crises and loss of revenue (Masullo, 2017; Powell,
2011). A recent survey conducted with senior supply chain professionals found that over
half of the business crises were directly linked to supply chain disruptions and were
predicted to continually increase (Masullo, 2017). Powell (2011) found supply chain
disruptions to be the most dangerous risk to an organization’s revenue drivers. The
fragility of a supply chain is due to the already thin margin and schedule suppliers face any delay or disruption has serious ramifications for organizations several steps down the
chain, as well as the end users (Fisher, 2011; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a; Manuj &
Mentzer, 2008b).
Managing supply chain risk is growing in importance as organizations recognize the
interdependent nature of supply chain operations and the domino effect of one disruption
in the supply chain (Faisal, 2009; Ritchie & Brindley, 2009; Zsidisin & Ritchie, 2009).
Long supply chains, including global supply chains, further increase supply chain
complexity and risk (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a; Manuj & Sahin, 2008; Norrman &
Jansson, 2004) and can limit organization flexibility in a crisis (Natarajarathinam et al.,
2009). Identifying exactly where product failure occurred in a complicated supply chain
can be challenging and time consuming.
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While supply chains are developed to reduce business expenses and increase
efficiency, a disruption to that supply chain or a failure in one of the links can expose
organizations to crises that can severely impact short-term bottom line and long-term
corporate reputation.
Organizational reputation, or the perception of the organization held by
stakeholders, is a valuable resource that is threatened during a crisis (Coombs &
Holladay, 2002; Seeger & Ulmer, 2001). Stakeholders are “any group or individual who
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman,
1984, p. 46). Positive interactions lead to favorable reputations while negative
interactions, such as a crisis, threaten positive reputation and can lead to unfavorable
reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Davies, Chun, Da Silva & Roper, 2003;
Dilenschneider, 2000).
Due to the varying perceptions of responsibility by both the stakeholder and
organization, crisis response strategies must be structured to seek understanding of both
perceived and actual responsibility. Despite an organization’s level of control over the
practices and timelines of suppliers, stakeholders will hold the organization selling the
end product responsible for any product failings. Organizations must balance
communicating to stakeholders regarding responsibility while determining the cause of
the supply chain issue internally.
The number of organizations with supply chains is steadily increasing
(Natarajarathinam et al., 2009) and the differences in supply chain crises versus other
organizational crises have not yet been examined in a communication context. Literature
on supply chains originates mostly from business and management journals. Current
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literature offers insight into proper management of supply chains (Blackhurst & Wu,
2009; Powell, 2011; Slack, Brandon-Jones, & Johnston, 2013; Zsidisin & Ritchie, 2009;
Zuckerman, 2002), risks inherent in the use of supply chains (Chapman, Christopher,
Jüttner, Peck & Wilding, 2002; Liu & Wang, 2011; Ritchie & Brindley, 2009;
Natarajarathinam et al., 2009), and other internal organizational objectives regarding
supply chain management (Blackhurst & Wu, 2009; Gaudenzi & Borghesi, 2006; Ritchie
& Brindley, 2009; Zuckerman, 2002) but fails to account for the external perception of an
organization from a stakeholder perspective. Organizations utilizing supply chains and
outsourcing control must be prepared to rationalize the stakeholder’s dissonance in the
event of a crisis. Stakeholders will hold the organization responsible for supply chain
crises regardless of the number of agencies involved within the supply chain. In
managing reputation and crisis response, organizations must acknowledge stakeholder
perceptions of responsibility, which may be at odds with actual responsibility. Supply
chain crises are pertinent for crisis communicators to study because they uniquely
challenge stakeholder attributions of responsibility during a crisis.
Supply chain crises also uniquely challenge organizational reputation through
complexity. With the rise of supply chain outsourcing, organizations now entail multiple
entities, complicating the level of control an organization has over its end product as well
as the stakeholder’s perception of what constitutes the organization. Where organizations
once controlled all elements of production, agency is now more commonly externalized
as organizations increasingly rely on supply chains for their products. While theorizations
of reputation originally only relied, inclusively, on the organization’s own actions, recent
crises have involved supply chain members constructing organizational reputation
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(Coombs, 2006; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Fombrun & van Riel, 2003; Newsom et al.,
2012). Winkleman (1999) states “For wherever the reputation goes, so goes the companyits profits, its stock price, its hold on the market, its hold on employees…” (p. 80). The
organizational response must take into account the impacted organizational reputation in
a complex and fragmented organizational makeup. Key to this complex environment is
the increasing widespread distribution of labor (outsourcing) and, in effect, the
distribution of control through increasing organizational members. Ultimately, utilization
of a supply chain introduces complexity and shared accountability, increasing the
challenge organizations face during crisis when reputation is dependent on members
outside the organization’s direct control.
The organizational response must take into account the impacted organizational
reputation as a result of conflicting perception of organizational responsibility and control
as organizations simultaneously manage at-fault suppliers while answering the
stakeholders’ demand for an explanation of the crisis. The unique attributions of
responsibility require an adapted approach to crisis response strategies. Hittle and
Leonard (2011) call for further examination of supply chain crisis management to
improve organizational functioning and stakeholder relations. This study answers that
call by examining the communication challenges inherent in supply chain crises due to
the dissonance of actual and perceived responsibility.
To begin, literature regarding stakeholder perceptions of crises and the pursuit of
identifying a responsible party is offered. In the next chapter, stakeholder theory and
attribution theory support the idea that in a supply chain crisis, organizations must
understand the varying stakeholder perspectives regarding the crisis, particularly
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regarding attribution of responsibility and control. Situational crisis communication
theory (SCCT), a potential crisis response framework for supply chain crises, is examined
within the context of a supply chain crisis. The challenge of establishing organizational
reputation when incorporating multiple entities within the organization is explored and
reconciled with the tenets of SCCT. Finally, literature on supply chain and supply chain
risk management is offered in order to contextualize the characteristics and risks
associated with this type of organizational model, as well as offer insight into the
challenges unique to a supply chain crisis.
A notable and recent supply chain crisis, Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 phone crisis, is
examined to highlight the complexities inherent in this distinct crisis type and to study the
organizational handlings of a past supply chain crisis, as well as media response. The
study concludes by providing theoretical implications and outlining future research on
supply chain crisis communication.
Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework
Stakeholder Perceptions of Crises
Crisis communication research explores the role of communication before, during
and after a crisis to better understand the impact of organizational response and
engagement on the onset of and recovery from a crisis (Coffelt, Smith, Sollitto, & Payne,
2010). Effective crisis management involves operational recovery or sustainment,
minimizing stakeholder and organizational losses, and learning from past experiences
(Miller & Horsley, 2009; Pearson & Clair, 1988). In times of crisis, an organization must
respond to publics and understand that organizational crises create crises for individuals
(Milburn, Schuler, & Waterman, 1983). Heath and Millar (2004) discuss the importance
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of individual perception regarding crises stating, “each crisis has an actual dimension and
a perceived dimension” (p. 6). Interpretation and perception is the way that the
individual is linked to the collective formation and actualization of crises: individual
perceptions of publics are important to consider during a crisis from an organizational
point of view.
Stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory supports this suggested importance of the
individual, positing that in the midst of a crisis, organizations should not remain narrowly
focused on stockholder’s needs, but rather consider the effects of the crisis on individual
stakeholders (Freeman & Gilbert, 1987). For an organization to successfully manage a
crisis, it must consider critical relationships to include stakeholders, or publics with an
actual or perceived tie to the organization (Freeman & Gilbert, 1987; Ulmer, 2001). Such
a perspective can “mean the difference between continued organizational successes and
organizational failures” (Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 71).
Waymer and Heath (2007) suggest a greater focus on the “voices of the affected
publics, those whose interests are part or most of the reason why the subject organization
is suffering a crisis and in need of responding to public and media inquiry” (p. 88).
Stakeholder theory offers this shifted focus, assigning all stakeholders intrinsic value and
going against the conventional assumption of the shareholder model which places focus
only on stakeholders that have a significant influence on shareholder value (Alpaslan,
Green, & Mitroff, 2009; Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Crisis managers operating
under this framework prioritize establishing mutually trusting and cooperative
relationships with stakeholders, put in the effort to best understand how different
stakeholders could be affected by and respond to a crisis, and are more cooperative in
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attending to individual stakeholder interests during a crisis, past the point of legal or
contractual obligation (Alpaslan et al., 2009; Jones, 1995). This approach is utilized for
both strategic and moral reasons. Strategically, consideration of all stakeholders
cognizant can lead to better crisis outcomes. Morally, a consideration of all stakeholders,
not just those recognized as impactful to the bottom line, is a more ethically strong
organizational practice. Alpaslan et al. (2009) propose crisis managers who utilize
stakeholder theory over the shareholder model have more successful outcomes, such as
faster crisis recovery time.
Organizations facing supply chain crises could benefit from a stakeholder oriented
perspective when deciding how to address the supply chain crisis and its skewed levels of
responsibility. An understanding of stakeholder perceptions regarding the attribution of
responsibility and control in the crisis is important to the creation of a successful crisis
response.
Attribution theory. Attribution theory helps us understand and anticipate how
people cope with events based on the amount of responsibility people attribute to the
individual or group responsible (Heider, 1958). Attribution theory is a useful framework
for crisis management (Coombs, 1995). Heider (1958) offers that individuals are active in
interpreting the interactions and events that occur and engage in logical and consistent
processes of sensemaking when interpreting. The process of interpretation is done in
order to both garner understanding, as well as establish control of the environment in
which the individual exists. In the instance of an organizational crisis, impacted
stakeholders are likely to engage in interpretation to make sense of the changing
environment and determine at-fault parties (Coombs, 2007).
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Heider (1958) developed attribution theory to examine the human tendency to
attach meaning to individual behaviors both within oneself and others. When an
individual deems a cause to their own or others’ behaviors, they determine an attribution
(Littlejohn, Foss & Oetzel, 2017). Attribution is an internal process, of thinking, as well
as an external process, of talking, to engage in interpretation and understanding of the
roots of causality for individual behavior and other’s behavior. The perceived cause of
the action in question can be attributed to that of dispositional or situational factors
(Dainton & Zelley, 2015). Dispositional factors are unique to the individual and are
relatively unchanging personal features such as personality or biological traits.
Situational factors are those that can be applied to organizations in crisis. These factors
are uncontrollable and established by the environment or specific circumstance, and are
contextually driven (Heider, 1958; Dainton & Zelley, 2015).
The process of attribution has been elaborated on to also include control, or whether
or not we believe the party in question was able or unable to alter the cause of the action
(Manusov & Spitzberg, 2008). Control attribution could occur when an organization
faces a supply chain crisis and cannot meet stakeholder demands. The stakeholder
engages in the process of attribution to determine whether the organization is facing the
supply chain crisis because of a circumstance that was able to be altered, such as a lack of
proper management of the supply chain, or lack of planning and preparing for supply
chain incidents, or unable to be altered, such as a natural disaster shutting down elements
of the supply chain.
A focus on attribution of responsibility deviates from the perceiver seeking cause of
an action and focuses more on the human desire to assign responsibility for the behavior
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or outcome (Manusov & Spitzberg, 2008). Attributions of responsibility are important to
studies of stakeholder sympathy in regard to corporate responsibility in crises. The more
responsibility an organization is perceived to have in regard to the crisis the greater the
negative stakeholder perception of the organization (Coombs, 2007; Manusov &
Spitzberg, 2008).
McAuley, Duncan, and Russell (1992) developed a measure of attribution of
responsibility based on (1) isolated stability, if the individual or group is frequently
involved in similar events; (2) external control, if outside sources or agents other than the
individual or group involved had some responsibility for the event; and (3) locus/personal
control, if the individual or group in question could have done something to prevent the
event
In a supply chain crisis, organizations should consider stakeholder attributions of
both control and responsibility. The stakeholder’s perception regarding the level of
organizational control over the supply chain crisis is more important for crisis response
strategies than the actual level of organizational control. Stakeholder’s perceptions of
organizational control will inform assessments of responsibility.
Organizational reputation. Reputation is an important resource for organizations
that affects publics’ behavioral intentions and attitudes toward the organization (Coombs
& Holladay, 2002; Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Newsom, Turk & Kruckeberg, 2012;
Seeger & Ulmer, 2001; Winkleman, 1999). An organization’s reputation is established by
understood values developed between the organization and its stakeholders (Coombs &
Holladay, 2006; Fombrun & van Riel, 2003; Newsom et al., 2012). Reputation is a result
of “what [organizations] do, what [they] say and what others say about [them]” (Newsom
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et al., 2012 p. 3). In other words, stakeholders form a reputation with organizations
through direct interactions, mediated interactions (such as media reports and advertising),
and word of mouth from other stakeholders (both in person and online) (Coombs, 2007).
Reputation is “widely recognized as a valuable, intangible asset” (Coombs, 2007, p. 164)
that can improve organizational standing. Coombs (2007) states “Most of the information
stakeholders collect about organizations is derived from the news media,” which is why
media reports are an important element of reputation management (p. 164).
The complexity of supply chains can complicate organizational reputation,
particularly at a time of crisis. Reputation is formed through “interactions and
communication between organizations and stakeholders” (Coombs & Holladay, 2006, p.
124; Fombrun & van Riel, 2003), but if an organization is not forthcoming regarding
their reliance on a supply chain, stakeholders may not include suppliers in their
perception of organizational reputation. In a supply chain crisis, however, suppliers are
actively involved and impacting the organization’s reputation. Supply chain crises can
further complicate reputation by introducing multiple organizational members that must
be incorporated into the mutually understood values of the organization at a time of
crisis.
Current research has not yet fully developed impacts of complexity on
organizational reputation; although stakeholders perceive organizations as singular, the
realities of an increasingly outsourced world translate to theoretical inconsistencies for
research and damaging consequences for organizations in crisis. Reliance on suppliers
and outsourcing of labor introduces greater potential for skewed perceptions of
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organizational reputation; in a supply chain crisis, organizations must answer as the sole
responsible party for multiple entities’ actions impacting reputation.
Barnett and Hoffman (2008) made a call for further research regarding reputation
past the traditional definition of corporate action alone impacting reputation. They
examined reputation in relation to other organizations under the notion of “the company
you keep affects the company you keep,” asserting the actions of surrounding, unrelated
organizations have an impact on the separate organization’s reputation (p. 1). Veil,
Dillingham and Sloan (2016) had similar findings proposing a spillover crisis, or when
“events in an external organization create concern, uncertainty, or perceptions of harm for
another organization” (p. 317). In a spillover crisis, an unrelated organization potentially
receives reputational damage, or negative spillover, due to a similar organization’s crisis.
While both supply chain crises and spillover crises deal with stakeholder perception
of organizational responsibility, it is important to note a key distinguishing factor
between the two, the element of control. In a spillover crisis an organization is unable to
control the happenings of an outside but related organization. A supply chain crisis, on
the other hand, is directly related to the organization as a member of its supply chain has
caused the crisis.
Responding to crises that involve supply chains and multiple identities creating
negative spillover complicates theory predicated on central organizational reputation and
requires new considerations of crisis response strategies to account for the complexity.
Crisis Response Strategy
As a function of public relations, the purpose of crisis communication response is to
prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and primarily to protect the interests of
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the organization at the heart of the crisis (Coombs, 2012). Responses include instructional
information for physical protection, adjusting information to help stakeholders cope
psychologically with the crisis, and reputation management responses to protect the
reputation of the organization both during and following the crisis (Sturges, 1994).
Instructing and adjusting information “represents what stakeholders need and want
to know after a crisis hits” and are crucial elements of crisis management (Coombs, 2006,
p. 246; Sturges, 1994). Instructional information describes what happened during the
crisis, or the crisis basics, and what, if anything, stakeholders must do to protect
themselves. Adjusting information includes the actions the organization is taking to fix
the problem and prevent the crisis from happening again (Coombs, 1999; Coombs, 2006;
Sturges, 1994). While organizations may not have all the information regarding the crisis,
what information the organization can offer should be given to stakeholders immediately
following the crisis (Coombs, 2006).
Coombs (1999) states instructing information can communicate organizational
control during a crisis to stakeholders. If an organization presents information regarding
the crisis basics, what stakeholders should do and how the organization is correcting the
crisis, stakeholders perceive the organization as more in control. Whether or not an
organization provides adequate instructing and adjusting information “also could affect
the organization’s reputation” (Coombs, 1999, p. 127) either positively or negatively.
Eisenberg (1984) argued for the use of strategically ambiguous communication
within organizations to allow for differing, individual perspectives regarding
organizational statements and values. Strategic ambiguity can also be used in crisis
response (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Ulmer & Sellnow, 1997). When used ethically and

12

effectively ambiguity can allow for multiple interpretations of the crisis if “through the
exchange of complete and unbiased information, ambiguity enhances the stakeholders’
understanding of the situation’s complexity” (Ulmer & Sellnow, 1997, p. 229).
Situational crisis communication theory. Following a crisis, organizations can
engage in crisis response strategies to: frame attributions of the crisis, influence
perceptions of the organization in crisis, and reduce the negative effects generated by the
crisis (Coombs, 1995; Coombs, 2007). SCCT, grounded in attribution theory, offers a
communication framework to best manage reputational affects of crises on an
organization. SCCT requires analysis of organizational standing and the current crisis
situation in order to predict likely stakeholder perceptions of the organization. Once
perceptions of the organization, its stakeholder relations, and climate of crisis are clear,
the best crisis response strategy to protect the organization’s reputation can be determined
(Coombs, 2007).
According to SCCT, individuals consider an organization’s crisis history, prior
relational reputation, and initial crisis responsibility when attributing crisis responsibility
to organizations (Coombs, 2007). Initial crisis responsibility “is a function of stakeholder
attributions of personal control for the crisis by the organization” or how much
stakeholders perceive the organization to have caused the crisis (Coombs, 1995; Coombs
& Holladay, 2002, p. 166). The greater the level of responsibility attributed to the
organization by stakeholders, the more damaging the crisis will be to organizational
reputation (Coombs, 1995; Coombs, 2006). A poor prior relational reputation with the
organization and/or a history of similar crises will intensify attributions of responsibility
and further increase reputational threat (Coombs, 2007).
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SCCT identifies three crisis types (victim, accidental, intentional) and
corresponding crisis response strategies (denial, diminish, rebuild). The response
strategies are aligned with the crisis types based on the amount of responsibility
attributed. The greater the attribution of responsibility in regards to the crisis, the greater
the crisis response accommodation to stakeholders.
Crisis type is assigned by how stakeholder perceptions are framing the crisis and is
the first step in determining perceptions of crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007; Coombs
& Holladay, 2002). The framing of the crisis impacts the framing of the message, which
“shapes how people define problems, causes of problems, attributions of responsibility,
and solutions to problems” (Coombs, 2007, p. 167; Coombs, 2015; Cooper, 2002). The
victim crisis type has very low attribution levels of responsibility such as a natural
disaster or product tampering. Accidental crisis types have minimal levels of crisis
responsibility and include such events as technical-error accident or technical-error
product harm. In this crisis type, stakeholders perceive the event to be uncontrollable or
unintentional by the organization (Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 2015). The intentional crisis
type attributes the highest level of responsibility to the organization and includes humanerror accidents, human-error product harm, and organizational misdeeds. In this crisis
framing, stakeholders perceive the crisis to be purposeful (Coombs, 2007; Coombs,
2015).
Crisis response strategies, or what the organization does and says following a crisis,
“are used to repair the reputation, to reduce negative affect, and to prevent negative
behavioral intentions” (Coombs, 2007, p. 170). Following a crisis, an organization must
accept the appropriate level of responsibility for the crisis and answer for the crisis’
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impact on stakeholders. Organizations can deny, diminish, or rebuild for the primary
crisis response strategy. The deny response is utilized when the organization either has no
responsibility for the crisis or seeks to demonstrate no crisis exists (Coombs, 2006). The
diminishing crisis response option acknowledges the existence of a crisis but argues the
level of responsibility of the organization is lower than stakeholders believe. Utilizing a
diminishing crisis response an organization can assume minimal responsibility or attempt
to persuade stakeholders the crisis is not as severe as originally presumed. When
assuming minimal responsibility, organizations express no intention to do harm or that
there was no way to prevent the crisis. If organizations attempt to minimize the harm of
the crisis, an explanation of why the crisis is less severe than stakeholders perceived it to
be should be offered (Coombs, 2006; Coombs, 2015). In this response strategy,
organizations seek to lessen the attributions of responsibility assigned by stakeholders. In
the rebuild crisis response strategy, organizations assume full responsibility for the crisis
and seek stakeholder forgiveness, sometimes offering compensation such as money, free
products or other gifts (Coombs, 2006; Coombs 2007; Coombs, 2015). Bolstering
strategies can also be used to supplement the primary response strategies in an attempt to
further increase reputational assets. Bolstering, in a sense, seeks to generate goodwill
amongst stakeholders and can be done through reminders of past organizational good
works, praising stakeholders, and/or painting the organization as a victim in the crisis
(Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 2015).
Coombs (2006) states “An appropriate crisis response strategy matches the level of
reputational damage generated by the crisis situation with the ‘protective powers’ of the
crisis response strategies” (p. 245). These protective powers refer to the “ability to create
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perceptions of the organization taking responsibility for the crisis and aiding victims”
(Coombs, 2006, p. 255). In other words, if crisis response strategies are selected
according to stakeholder perceptions of responsibility, the aligned response has the
potential to positively impact the organization’s reputation and improve the crisis
situation. Accordingly, organizations that select crisis response strategies that do not
align with stakeholder assessments of control and responsibility will not benefit from the
“protective powers” that would be offered by an aligned response strategy.
While SCCT offers an effective framework to determine crisis response in order to
impact stakeholder perceptions, the theory does not account for actual versus perceived
levels of responsibility in crises where responsibility is obscured. Supply chain crises are
generally not under the direct control of an organization, but if the organization does not
attune to the unique stakeholder perceptions regarding the organization as the at-fault
party, the correct crisis response strategy will not be selected. Organizations must utilize
SCCT in conjunction with stakeholder theory to determine stakeholder perceptions of
responsibility versus organizational assessments of responsibility.
To better understand the communicative strategies needed in a supply chain crisis, a
description of supply chains, and the unique characteristics of supply chain risk
management is outlined next.
Supply Chain Management
Supply chains function to meet customer demand through an interconnected system
of suppliers, production facilities, and related systems working toward production of a
final product (Blackhorse & Wu, 2009; Stock & Boyer, 2009). Prioritizing efficiency,
supply chains attempt to meet consumer demands while maintaining low inventory costs.
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Supply chains are ultimately responsible for customer satisfaction and should involve all
phases of design, procurement, manufacturing, and distribution (Sinha, Whitman &
Malzahn, 2004). Gaudenzi and Borghesi (2006) suggest each member of the supply chain
has unique approaches and goals but should be united under the common goal of the final
market product and highest level of service for customers. Supply chain management
serves to organize these motivations across the various organizations involved in order to
establish efficient and satisfactory production for consumers.
Supply chain management requires a mindset of collaboration to coordinate all
entities involved in the supply chain in order for the supply chain to work as effectively
and seamlessly as possible (Zuckerman, 2002). Blackhurst and Wu (2009) assert
“Effective supply chain management is a crucial component of a firm’s ability to fill
consumer demand, regardless of the industry” (p. 1). Zuckerman (2002) makes a similar
claim stating “Companies today cannot ignore supply chain management and expect to
survive. Nowadays, supply chain thinking is common operating practice for all major
corporations worldwide” (p. 4).
Slack et al. (2013) offer five performance objectives to evaluate a supply chains’
effectiveness in meeting both performance goals as well as customer satisfaction. Supply
chains are evaluated on quality, speed, dependability, flexibility, and cost. Maintaining all
performance objectives across the entirety of a supply chain is challenging for managers.
With the interdependence of all suppliers, the supply chain is vulnerable to the varying
constraints and fluctuations of all supply chain members (Slack et al., 2013). These
concerns expose organizations to increased levels of risk as the level of control over the
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final product decreases and the potential for breaks in the supply chain can lead to delays
or halts on production (Powell, 2011; Slack et al., 2013).
The importance of incorporating supply chain risk management alongside supply
chain management is summarized well by Zsidisin and Ritchie (2009):
[Supply chain management] today demands a much more proactive, strategic and
corporate approach, engaging with the other organizations throughout the supply
chain in seeking to gain sustainable competitive advantage and profitability through
leaner, more agile, efficient, resilient, comprehensive and customer-focused
strategies. Developments of this nature may not automatically reduce the risks and
indeed may certainly change the profile of risks encountered if not increasing them
(p. 2).
Supply chain risk management. A universal definition of risk is difficult to offer
as definitions of the concept vary depending on the academic and professional discipline
in question (Ritchie & Brindley, 2009). Generally, risk can be defined as “the extent to
which there is uncertainty about whether potentially significant and/or disappointing
outcomes of decisions will be realized” (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992, p. 9). Risks to supply
chains can be divided into external and internal factors, with some researchers adding the
factor of network relation to the categorization (Chapman et al., 2002). Examples of
internal risk include production issues, structural defects, labor concerns, and IT-related
incidents. External risks include political and legal influences, natural disasters, social
factors and marketing risks. Network related risks are the interactions among the
organizations involved in the supply chain (Chapman et al., 2002; Liu & Wang, 2011;
Natarajarathinam et al., 2009). Each risk type has the potential to result in a supply chain
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disruption, and potentially a supply chain crisis for which an organization must
answer. With a variety of potential disruptions to the supply chain it is unsurprising that
supply chains ranked as one of the top three business risk areas by 500 financial
executives in both the United States and Europe (Ritchie & Brindley, 2009).
Organizations utilizing supply chains face “increasingly uncertain demand as well
as supply” making supply chain risk management a burgeoning area of management that
is being implemented more frequently (Lee, 2008, p. 99; Zsidisin & Ritchie, 2009).
Supply chain risk management takes a proactive approach to mitigating disruptions in the
supply chain and is dependent on quality management to foresee potential disruptions and
create plans to mitigate the negative impacts of a supply chain disruption when it occurs
(Ritchie & Brindley, 2009).
A global supply chain introduces further complexity with greater numbers of
suppliers to manage and various international constraints. As Barry (2004) states, “The
scope of supply chain sources and the markets are global; so is the risk” (p. 695).
Researchers are looking specifically at global supply chain risk management to best
assess risks unique to global supply chains (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a; Manuj & Mentzer,
2008b).
The burgeoning field of supply chain management and risk management
demonstrates the growing organizational recognition of the risks inherent with supply
chains and the necessity for internal measures to manage these risks. Just as organizations
have begun to realize the need for internal processes to prevent and mitigate supply chain
risks, external measures must be put in place to respond when such risks are realized and
result in supply chain disruptions and potential crises.
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Research Questions
Supply chain crises simultaneously distort attributions of responsibility while
challenging perceptions of organizational reputation. The fundamental suggestion of
SCCT— use crisis responsibility level to guide crisis response— is key to the acute
paradox underlying supply chain crises. When suppliers are identified during a crisis,
stakeholder notions of organizational reputation are complicated by the involvement of
multiple organizations not before considered as part of the organization. Current crisis
response strategy does not account for the reputational shift from a single to multiple
identities and crisis response strategy literature fails to incorporate the perceived and
actual level of responsibility an organization has over the crisis, as demonstrated through
supply chain crises. As more diverse suppliers are incorporated into an organization’s
function and appearance, response strategies must adapt to the increasing dissonance
between responsibility and reputation.
To demonstrate this unique crisis type, Samsung’s 2015 Galaxy Note 7 phone
crisis will be examined. In August, 2016, Samsung released its Galaxy Note 7
smartphone in an attempt to reach holiday markets and beat out competitor, Apple, for a
new smartphone release during the profitable sales time (Brody, 2016). Less than one
week after being placed on the market, reports regarding phones overheating and
batteries exploding surfaced (Lee & Pak, 2016). The unpredictable nature of the
exploding cell phones led the United States Federal Aviation Association and the United
States Consumer Product Safety Commission to issue a ban on all Galaxy Note 7s from
aircrafts and advisement for consumers to discontinue use of the phone (Dolcourt, 2017).
Samsung issued a global recall for over 2.5 million phones and offered customers a
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replacement phone. Samsung utilized a new supplier for the replacement cell phones;
however, despite this new supplier, Samsung yet again faced reports of batteries
overheating and exploding phones (Lee & Pak, 2016). After this, Samsung discontinued
the production of the Galaxy Note 7 and advised consumers to stop using the device.
Estimations show the company lost upwards of $5 billion due to this supply chain crisis
(Brody, 2016; Dolcourt, 2017). To examine this case, the following research questions
are posed:
RQ1: What crisis response strategies did Samsung use during the supply chain
crisis to communicate with publics?
RQ2: What are the stakeholder attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s
supply chain crisis as seen through media reports?
RQ3: What are the organization’s attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s
supply chain crisis as seen through organizational documents?
RQ4: What challenges did Samsung experience during the supply chain crisis and
resulting recall as evidenced by the organizational documents and media reports?
Chapter Three: Methods
The purpose of case study research is to develop the boundaries of contemporary
phenomenon, cognizant to the larger context surrounding the process; as Yin (2002)
observes, “The case study is the method of choice when the phenomenon under study is
not readily distinguishable from its context” (p. 4). Case studies explicate the problem
through observable mechanisms, including “a discussion of important elements, and
finally, ‘lessons to be learned’” (Creswell, 1998, p. 221). Yin (1981) advocates a
scholarly recognition of the narrative implicit to crisis events through qualitative and
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critical research; case studies can “provide description, test theory, or generate theory”
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 535). Case study research examines a broad range of historical,
attitudinal, and behavioral issues and should be conducted in a comprehensive applied
manner with the intent of translating the work into practical recommendations (Yin,
2002).
Data Collection
Media reports and organizational documents from Samsung were collected to
identify the crisis timeline, compose a crisis summary, and examine crisis communication
strategies and attributions of responsibility in the case study.
Media reports. A Google News Search with the search term “Samsung Galaxy
note 7” and a date range of 08/01/2016, the month that the phones were released, until
02/28/2018 to allow for the most current news coverage, returned 4,280,000 results. The
search was then narrowed to “Samsung Galaxy note 7 supply chain” with a return of
10,500 results. Many articles from the original search were included in the narrowed
search term. Of the 10,500 “Samsung Galaxy note 7 supply chain” results, 50 unique
articles were identified. The evidence in this case summary includes 36 news articles
from the following sources: USA Today (n= 3), The New York Times (n= 8), National
Public Radio (n= 2), Forbes (n= 4), The Wall Street Journal (n= 6), CNBC (n= 3),
Fortune (n= 2), TIME (n= 1), Reuters (n= 3), NBC (n= 1), BBC (n= 1), and The
Washington Post (n= 2) and 14 industry specific online magazines including CNET (n=
5), Supply Chain 247 (n= 1), Supply Chain Dive (n= 3), Wired (n= 1), Slate (n= 1), The
Verge (n= 2), Fast Company (n= 1), and Tech Radar (n=1).
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Organizational documents. To obtain organizational documents, the search
feature on Samsung’s website was used. The range of time from when the device was
released, 08/01/2016, until the month the cause of the faulty phones was determined,
01/30/2017, was searched with the term “Galaxy Note7” retrieving all organizational
statements from Samsung during that time (n= 20). Samsung’s first organizational
statement was on August 2, 2016 revealing the new smartphone and its features. The first
statement acknowledging the overheating phones was on September 2, 2016, when the
organization explained the product exchange program for consumers with faulty phones.
A series of statements throughout September offered updates regarding the growing
severity of the overheating and exploding phones. On September 15, 2016 the voluntary
US recall was announced. By October 10, 2016 Samsung announced the Galaxy Note 7
would not be sold in stores any longer. The organization released a final statement on
January 22, 2017 offering an explanation as to why the phones were overheating.
Data Analysis
Before analysis, all documents were placed in chronological order to develop an
understanding of the progression of the supply chain crisis. In order to best understand
the details of the crisis, an initial overview of the data included reading each document
and taking notes. Data was examined based on category of retrieval and within the
category, in chronological order (for example, media reports were examined in the order
they were released, then organizational documents in order of their release).
Both inductive and deductive analyses were used to examine the organizational
documents and media reports. Although qualitative research often relies on inductive
analysis, researchers advocate for a balanced approach to qualitative research using both
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inductive and deductive processes (Hyde, 2000; Kirk & Miller, 1986; Parke, 1993).
Relying only on inductive analysis “could deprive the research of useful theoretical
perspectives and concepts” while relying only on deductive analysis “could preclude the
researcher from developing new theory (Hyde, 2000, p. 88). Deductive analysis was used
for the following research questions:
RQ1: What crisis response strategies did Samsung use during the supply chain
crisis to communicate with publics?
RQ2: What are the stakeholder attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s
supply chain crisis as seen through media reports?
RQ3: What are the organization’s attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s
supply chain crisis as seen through organizational documents?
Analysis for RQ1 was guided by the crisis response framework SCCT (Coombs,
1995; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Coombs, 2006; Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 2015) in
order to assess Samsung’s crisis response strategies during the crisis. Samsung’s
organizational responses were found in the data and coded for qualities present in the
SCCT response strategies.
Analysis of RQ2 and RQ3 was guided by attribution theory (Heider, 1958) and
measured according to Stratton’s (1997) attributional coding process. Each attributional
statement was coded to ensure the statement met the standard dimension of attribution, or
that the crisis was a result of an identifiable condition or event.
Inductive thematic analysis was used to analyze organizational documents and
media reports to answer the following research question:
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RQ4: What challenges did Samsung experience during the supply chain crisis and
resulting recall as evidenced by the organizational documents and media reports?
Clarke and Braun (2014) offer “a good [thematic analysis] involves more than
simply reporting what is in the data; it involves telling an interpretive story about the data
in relation to a research question” (p. 6626). Guest, MacQueen and Namey (2012) state
thematic analysis can offer perspectives regarding not only the subjective human
experience but also the “social and cultural phenomena as well” (p. 18). Both Clarke and
Braun (2014) and Guest et al.’s (2012) assessments of potential benefits of thematic
analysis support the application of the process in the current research. Assessing a past
supply chain crisis through not only the organizational or stakeholder lens but the greater
social and cultural lens as well can offer improved understanding of the unique
challenges of a supply chain crisis.
Steps to a successful thematic analysis range in number depending on the author
but are similar in concept (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Guest et al., 2012; Chapman, Hadfield,
& Chapman, 2015). Generally, the researcher must familiarize themselves with the data.
Next, potential themes should be identified. After themes are identified, they should be
reviewed, defined and named. Finally, conclusions should be drawn (Braun & Clarke,
2006; Guest et al.; Chapman et al., 2015). Analysis was conducted similarly to the
suggestions of Clarke and Braun (2014) and Braun and Clarke (2006). As suggested,
research questions guided the analysis of the data while also allowing for new,
unanticipated themes to emerge.
The data was repeatedly examined in order to immerse the researcher in the data,
through reading and rereading of the dataset and developing understanding of the context
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of the data (Chapman et al., 2015). Both asides and commentaries were regularly taken as
the data was examined. Asides, or succinct and clear reflections of the text and questions
regarding the text, were written along the media reports and organizational documents
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Commentaries, or more elaborate asides dealing with broader
issues, were taken on a separate page as organizational documents and media reports
were reviewed (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). As Lindlof and Taylor (2011) state, asides and
commentaries are “jumping-off points for conceptual categories” (p. 244) based off what
strikes the researcher as important or intriguing and are thus speculative. These
comments help inform the next stage of the thematic analysis process, coding.
Once the crisis was thoroughly reviewed, the research question guided the first
round of analysis through open coding line by line (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). In this
phase, the data was coded for smaller pieces of potentially meaning information (Clarke
& Braun, 2014). After the data was combed through initially for qualities present in the
research questions, the data was again examined to allow for new insights not previously
accounted for within the research questions. The constant-comparative method was used
to “see more clearly how the categories are differentiated from each other, how they
interrelate, and how full (or empty) of compelling evidence they are” (Lindlof & Taylor,
2011, p. 251).
After codes were established, a wider focus was placed on the data to identify
pertinent themes across codes. Organizing the coded data by broader meaning offers
insight into patterns across the dataset that are important to the research questions, as well
as new insights not anticipated (Clarke & Braun, 2014). Triangulation, through analysis
of various data types (in this research through the organizational documents and media
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reports) was also used as the method “represents a comprehensive and accurate picture of
the data” and improves validity of the findings (Chapman et al., 2015, p. 203; Lindlof &
Taylor, 2011).
Chapter Four: Analysis
This study sought to better understand communication strategies used during a
supply chain crisis, attribution of responsibility during a supply chain crisis, and
communication challenges inherent to this unique type of crisis. By examining a recent
supply chain crisis, Samsung’s Galaxy Note7 crisis, analysis of media reports and
organizational documents offers insight into previously used crisis response strategies by
an organization facing a supply chain crisis, as well as media attributions and
organizational attributions of responsibility. This study allowed for new communication
challenge themes to emerge to be explored in future research.
Crisis Response Strategies
In a crisis, an organization must answer for its actions by accepting responsibility
and demonstrating accountability (Coombs, 2007). SCCT offers crisis response strategies
as a way for organizations to accept responsibility in the eyes of its stakeholders. To
assess Samsung’s crisis response strategies, organizational documents and media reports
released during the time of the crisis were used to answer the following research
question:
RQ1: What communication strategies did Samsung use during the supply chain
crisis to communicate with publics?
Analysis was guided by the crisis response framework SCCT (Coombs, 1995;
Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Coombs, 2006; Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 2015) to assess
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strategies used by the organization during the crisis to communicate with its publics.
Primary crisis response strategies should be chosen based on the level of acceptance of
responsibility and include: deny, diminish, and rebuild (Coombs, 2006). Secondary
response strategies, or bolstering, can be used to supplement the primary strategies.
Samsung used all three primary strategies as well as the secondary strategy of
bolstering. The use of response strategies shifted as the crises progressed. First, deny and
diminish were used, assuming no responsibility or minimal responsibility. Rebuild
strategies were used toward the end of the crisis, assuming responsibility and seeking
forgiveness. Bolstering was used throughout.
Deny. Initially, Samsung denied responsibility asserting “heating issues reported
by Galaxy Note 7 users could have been caused by using different cables or adaptors than
the ones supplied with the phone” (Valerio, 2016, para. 8) and placing blame on an
isolated supplier who was no longer in use (Lee & Lee, 2016). Samsung’s denial
strategies were found in media reports based on statements made by the organization, but
were not found in the organizational documents online.
Diminish. Samsung diminished the severity of the crisis in organizational
documents. Statements minimizing the number of overheated and exploding devices such
as: “While there have only been a small number of reported incidents” (Samsung, 2016a,
para. 2) and “Although there have only been a small number of reported incidents”
(Samsung, 2016d, para. 3) were included before explaining the steps the organization was
taking to address the crisis. Emphasizing a low number of reported issues aligns with the
diminish crisis response strategies as Samsung acknowledged the existence of a crisis but
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argued the severity of the crisis was less than stakeholders may have perceived (Coombs,
2006; Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2002).
Rebuild. Rebuild crisis strategies were seen in both organizational documents and
media reports once the recall was issued. Rebuild strategies include compensation, or
offering crisis victims gifts or money, and apology, when the organization assumes full
responsibility and asks for stakeholder forgiveness (Coombs, 2007). Compensation in the
form of bill credit or a gift card was offered to customers under shifting conditions. First,
$25 was offered if customers chose a Galaxy Note 7 family device when exchanging the
phone (Samsung, 2016a) and then expanded to exchanges for any other Samsung product
(Samsung, 2016d). Once the second recall was in place, compensation was increased to
$100 bill credit “for a customer who exchanges a Note 7 for another Samsung
smartphone” and $25 bill credit for those seeking a refund or purchasing another
smartphone (Samsung, 2016j, para. 5). Apology was used after Samsung decided to stop
production and sale of the Galaxy Note 7. The organization ran a full page ad in The New
York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal stating “An important
tenet of our mission is to offer best-in-class safety and quality. Recently, we fell short on
this promise. For this we are truly sorry” (Samsung, 2016k, para 1).
Bolstering. Finally, Samsung used bolstering strategies throughout the crisis in
the organization documents. Bolstering is a strategy used to supplement the primary crisis
response strategies and help repair organizational reputation by reminding customers of
past good works and praising stakeholders for their patience and understanding (Coombs,
2007). Samsung’s consistent pride in their brand and reminders of customer safety
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prioritization were examples of bolstering as the organization reminded stakeholders of
its positive traits in the midst of a crisis.
Examples of Samsung’s bolstering include “Samsung continues to deliver the
highest quality products” (Samsung, 2016b, para. 1), “Samsung has taken great care to
provide affected consumers with the support they need” (Samsung, 2016d, para. 3),
“Samsung is committed to producing the highest quality products” (Samsung, 2016d,
para. 1), and “We thank the Department of Transportation, airlines, airports, our partners
and Note 7 owners for their patience and support during this time” (Samsung, 2017a,
para. 3).
Samsung used all crisis response strategies, however, theory suggests crisis
response strategies should be chosen based on the attribution of responsibility held by
stakeholders toward organizations for the perceived control and responsibility in the
crisis. In order to best assess the crisis response strategies used, attribution of
responsibility must be understood.
Attribution of Responsibility
To understand the attributions of responsibility during the Galaxy Note 7 crisis
and begin explicating the role of responsibility in a supply chain crisis that may differ
from previous conceptions of clear-cut responsibility during a crisis, the following
questions were posed:
RQ2: What are the stakeholder attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s
supply chain crisis as seen through media reports?
RQ3: What are the organization’s attributions of responsibility during Samsung’s
supply chain crisis as seen through organizational documents?
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Analysis of RQ2 and RQ3 was guided by attribution theory (Heider, 1958) and
Stratton’s (1997) attributional coding process. In coding, an attributional statement was
one that “an outcome is indicated as having happened, or being present, because of some
identified event or condition” (Stratton, 1997, p. 124). Attributional statements had to
meet the dimensions of internal/ external and/ or controllable/ uncontrollable. Internal/
external dimension assesses if the cause originated within the organization or was an
external circumstance. Controllable/ uncontrollable assesses if the organization could
have exerted a significant amount of control over the crisis or the crisis was completely
out of the organization’s control (Stratton, 1997).
Stakeholder attributions of responsibility, as seen through media reports (RQ1)
unanimously attributed Samsung as the at-fault party. Such attributions of responsibility
include “Samsung is to blame” (Swartz, 2016, para. 9), “Samsung… did not do the type
of quality assurance and testing to make sure the Galaxy Note 7 was designed properly
and totally safe” (Sullivan, 2016, para. 9), “Procedures have been either lax or ignored,
and the safety checks you would expect to be present did not catch the flawed design”
(Spence, 2016, para. 13), “If it’s once, it could be taken as a mistake. But for Samsung,
the same thing happened twice with the same model” (“Samsung permanently stops
Galaxy Note 7 production,” 2016, para. 16), and “Samsung… did not do the type of
quality assurance and testing to make sure the Galaxy Note 7 was designed properly and
totally safe” (Sullivan, 2016, para. 9). All attributions held Samsung directly responsible
with most speculating the organization rushed the production and pushed design
capabilities in order to compete with Apple’s iPhone 7 release. USA Today reported an
expert on lithium batteries said Samsung was at fault “for trying to create what he calls a
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thinner ‘club sandwich’ – a layer of electrodes stacked in the phones battery – to give its
devices a sleek design” (Swartz, 2016, para. 9) and an analyst with Bloomberg
Intelligence stated “They were rushing to beat Apple and they made a mistake” (Spence,
2016, para. 9).
Samsung, on the other hand, did not attribute responsibility in any of the
organizational documents (RQ3). The organization indirectly accepted responsibility
following the recalls but did not attribute responsibility during the crisis. The acceptance
of responsibility can be seen when President and COO Tim Baxter stated Samsung
“appreciated the patience of our consumers, carrier and retail partners” and asserted
Samsung was “committed to doing everything we can to make it right” (Samsung, 2016j,
para. 4). At the press conference held in January, 2017 where the organization
conclusively revealed the reason behind the overheating phones, President of Mobile
Communications Business, DJ Koh “expressed his sincere apology and gratitude” but did
not outright state Samsung was at-fault.
As noted in media reports, however, Samsung originally attributed responsibility
to forces outside of the organization’s control- consumers using incorrect charging
equipment and a supplier no longer in use. EBN, an online community and reporting site
for global supply chain professionals, and Supply Chain Dive, an industry news cite
focused specifically on the supply chain industry, both report Samsung attributing the
cause of the overheating phones as something that “could have been caused by using
different cables or adaptors than the ones supplied with the phone” (Spieler, 2016;
Valeria, 2016, para. 8). The New York Times reported on September 2, 2016, the day
Samsung confirmed the first Galaxy Note 7 recall, that “Samsung said it thought the
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problem came from a ‘minute flaw’ in the production of the batteries. Samsung would
not name the supplier involved” (Mozur & Lee, 2016, para. 12). In contrast, Samsung’s
organizational documents from the same day announcing the recall did not attribute
responsibility and reference a supplier issue, instead stating the recall was a result of “a
battery cell issue” (Samsung, 2016b, para.1) and “isolated battery cell issues” (Samsung,
2016a, para. 1).
While media reports demonstrate a clear attribution of responsibility, holding the
organization at fault for the overheating phones, the organization did not have as clear of
attribution. This lack of awareness of responsibility was demonstrated in the array of
crisis response strategies Samsung employed. The difference in the number of
attributional statements in media reports (n= 18) versus organizational documents (n= 0)
further indicates Samsung did not prioritize establishment of a coherent attribution during
the crisis. Interestingly, the only acceptance of responsibility by Samsung is done by
statements to the media and the full page advertisement in major newspapers. The clarity
with which Koh states “We now feel a painful responsibility for failing to test and
confirm that there were problems in the design and manufacturing of batteries before we
put the product out to the market” (Sang-Hun & Mozur, 2017, para. 9) at the 2017 press
conference held to explain the cause of the overheating phones, assumes responsibility
more than any organizational document.
Samsung’s Supply Chain Crisis Challenges
Thematic analysis of media reports and organizational documents was conducted
to answer RQ4 (What challenges did Samsung experience during the supply chain crisis
and resulting recall as evidenced by the organizational documents and media reports?).
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Overarching themes of both supply chain systems challenges and communication
challenges were identified.
System challenges. Unsurprisingly, as the Galaxy Note 7 crisis was a direct result
of a fault in the supply chain, the theme of supply chain challenges was prevalent in
media documents. The theme was not, however, mentioned in Samsung’s organizational
documents. Thus, a divide in organizational response and media priority was found in the
inductive analysis as it was with the deductive analysis of attribution of responsibility.
Media reports, such as The Wall Street Journal’s position, on the role of Samsung’s crisis
in better understanding supply chain complexities were recurrent:
Samsung Electronic Co.’s botched recall of its Galaxy Note 7 smartphone is
putting a spotlight on supply-chain oversight and raising questions about the
ability of today’s technology and management tools to help companies maintain
quality control in giant complex networks of suppliers- as when products are
being built and upgraded more swiftly (Loten & Norton, 2016, para. 1).
The supply chain challenges that emerged in the analysis included: the difficulty of
managing a supply chain even for large companies, increased risks in global supply
chains, dangers of shared suppliers across an industry, and the affect of industry
pressures.
Strong chains still have gaps. The challenge of effectively managing a supply
chain is articulated by the not one, but two supply chain crises Samsung, an organization
known for its prowess in supply chain management, faced. The New York Times supports
Samsung’s position of expertise in supply chain management commenting “the recall
strikes at the heart of what has long been considered [Samsung’s] greatest strength: its
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management of the supply chain” (Mozur & Lee, 2016, para. 28) and concludes the
article stating “You wouldn’t think this would happen to a company like that, but
somehow it slipped through” (para. 32). Suggestions for supply chain managers emerged
in media reports during coverage of Samsung’s crisis. A call for greater supply chain
visibility in order to catch issues in production before they result in crises (Spieler, 2016),
improved supplier relationships with an emphasis on value from suppliers, as opposed to
low cost, and quality control (Brody, 2016) were recommended based off of Samsung’s
recalls.
After the Galaxy Note 7 phones had been pulled from the market and ceased
production, during the January 2017 press conference revealing the cause of the
overheating phones, The New York Times noted the surprising occurrence of Samsung’s
back-to-back supply chain crisis stating “the most interesting part of the presentation was
what Samsung did not say: How could such a technologically advanced titan – a symbol
of South Korea’s considerable industrial might – allow the problems to happen to begin
with?” (Sang-Hun & Mozur, 2017, para. 2).
Globalization of supply chains. Research shows global supply chains, while
offering cheap labor and raw materials, are coupled with uncertainties and heightened
risks (Barry, 2004; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008a; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008b). Valerio (2016)
well summarizes globalization in today’s supply chain stating “Organizations are finding
that the supply chain is infinitely more complex than it was twenty or thirty years ago”
(para. 3). Timothy Brown, managing director at Georgia Institute of Technology’s Supply
Chain & Logistics Institute, cautions that “companies looking to reduce costs by
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outsourcing much of their supply chain to countries with cheaper labor markets also run
the risk of sacrificing quality” (Loten & Norton, 2016, para. 9).
Samsung’s supply chain crisis was further complicated and more difficult to
manage due to reliance on a global supply chain. Comments regarding global supply
chains remark on a system that is “very stressed” (Valerio, 2016, para. 3) with the
potential for “low standards and few regulations” (Mozur & Lee, 2016, para. 27)
particularly regarding smartphone batteries since the market is “full of counterfeits”
(Valerio, 2016, para. 9).
Samsung also met problems identifying the cause of the crisis during the first
recall due to the lengthy and complex global supply chain (Loten et al., 2016). Media
reports noticed the organization’s lack of clarity regarding the root of the issue and made
comments such as “Samsung still doesn’t even know the source of the problem”
(Sullivan, 2016, para. 2) and “Exactly what went wrong remains unclear” (Oremus, 2016,
para. 3). Interestingly enough, the at-fault supplier for the first recall was eventually
determined to be from Samsung’s own facility, Samsung SDI (Lee & Lee, 2016). This
introduced a new concern for the crisis as Samsung SDI supplied lithium-ion batteries to
many top electronic brands, including Apple (Lee & Lee, 2016; Spieler, 2016; Valerio,
2016).
Shared suppliers increase spillover risk. Until the exact issue was pinpointed,
media reports questioned the safety of products containing Samsung SDI batteries.
Samsung’s own facility was then placed under the microscope as speculations of safety
of electronics other than Galaxy Note 7s caused concern for companies such as Apple
that utilized the lithium-ion supplier (Lee & Lee, 2016; Spieler, 2016; Valerio, 2016).
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When Samsung SDI was revealed to be the cause of the faulty batteries, Valerio (2016)
speculated “this development could disrupt the supply chain for new devices for the rest
of the year” (para. 2). While this element of the Galaxy Note 7 crisis did not impact
Samsung Electronics, the risk of reliance on the same suppliers is important for
understanding supply chain crises and potential risks of supply chain interdependence.
Although not Apple’s crisis, the brand was mentioned in the media during the
Galaxy Note 7 coverage. For example: “Samsung’s recall could affect more than just the
South Korean company. Samsung SDI, the company’s battery maker also supplies
batteries to various other companies including Apple” (Spieler, 2016, para. 1) and “The
company… makes batteries for other phone-makers too, including Apple” (Lee & Lee,
2016). Reliance on the same suppliers in the industry opens organizations up to the
potential for a spillover crisis (Veil et al., 2016). Samsung faced a supply chain crisis as
the Galaxy Note 7 contained faulty batteries from one member of the supply chain. Apple
faced a potential spillover crisis as a result of sharing lithium battery suppliers with the
perceived unsafe Samsung supplier.
Reliance on the same supplier was not the only tie to Apple in the Galaxy Note 7
crisis. Media reports commonly speculated that a major contributing factor to the faulty
smartphone was rushed production by Samsung to beat Apple’s iPhone 7 release date and
attempts to overextend the brand’s technological abilities to keep up with smartphone
industry pressures.
Industry pressures stretch capability. In hopes to beat competitor Apple’s new
iPhone release date, Samsung pressured suppliers to hurry production, and engineers to
innovate quickly, to regain standing in smartphone sales (Oremus, 2016). This rush and
37

overextension of technological capability was mentioned often in media reports.
Bloomberg News released a story with the title “Rush to Take Advantage of a Dull
iPhone Started Samsung’s Battery Crisis” (Lee & Lee, 2016). Other stories seconded the
sentiment. “It wasn’t meant to be this way” Forbes states, “The South Korean company
brought forward this launch and the retail side of the Galaxy Note 7 by ten days this year,
to early August. That offered it clear air before the iPhone 7 family would arrive”
(Spence, 2016, para. 2). Multiple articles make similar claims such as “Samsung was
counting on the Galaxy Note 7 to maintain momentum against Apple’s new iPhones”
(“Samsung Galaxy Note 7 batteries reportedly catch fire”, 2016, para. 2), “The recall puts
Samsung, which has been trying to match the success of the Apple iPhone, in a
precarious position” (Mozur & Lee, 2016, para. 3), and “The Galaxy is one of the South
Korean company’s most visible consumer product lines, and its smartphones compete
with the Apple iPhone for pre-eminence with consumers” (Kang, 2016, para. 9). Industry
pressures and competitive positioning that led to the rushed production “can’t come at the
expense of quality control” (Brody, 2016, para. 1; Loten & Norton, 2016; Oremus, 2016)
and yet, for Samsung, that was the case.
Samsung is not alone in feeling the industry pressure to produce and innovate
rapidly. While “Samsung in particular has developed a reputation for jamming as many
features as possible into a single handset” (Oremus, 2016, para. 14), Oremus (2016)
proposes other smartphone industry leaders absorb Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 crisis as a
cautionary tale:
We might look back on Samsung’s battery meltdown as an inflection point in the
history of the industry, when the frantic push for smartphone-makers to launch
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‘revolutionary’ new devices every year or two finally ran up against the physical
limits of the form (para. 16).
The complications due to the organization’s complex supply chain and the various
noted implications supply chain managers can take away from Samsung’s case may
inform why the organization was not perceived as transparent or effective communicators
during the crisis.
Communication challenges. Subthemes related specifically to communication
challenges were also found in Samsung’s organizational documents and the media
reports. While balancing the interests and needs of all involved is undeniably difficult,
Samsung did not effectively communicate during the crisis. Avi Greengart, an analyst at
Current Analysis, a global market research firm, commented “They have not been very
clear in their communications, in terms of what specifically is the problem, how it will be
resolved and what’s the time frame” (Selyukh, 2016, para. 15). Specifically, themes
emerged regarding transparency, ambiguous instruction, mixed messages, “unsafe”
reputation, and consumer defiance.
Lack of transparency. Media reports offered frustrated pleas to Samsung to clarify
statements, proactively share information, and assume responsibility for the crisis.
Commentary such as “they’ve under communicated, rather than over communicated”
echoed sentiments commonly portrayed in media reports (Selyukh, 2016, para. 21).
Sullivan (2016) stated “From the very beginning Samsung should have been more honest
about the problem. It should have called the thing by its proper name- a product recall.
Instead it called it an exchange program” (para. 12). Oremus (2016) summarized this
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frustration during the second recall stating “Samsung could recover more quickly if it can
show transparency and accountability in its handling of the investigation” (para. 7).
Ambiguous phrasing such as “exchange program” instead of global recall, the
aforementioned minimizing of the number of faulty devices, terming the overheating
phones as “incidents” (Samsung, 2016a; Samsung, 2016b; Samsung, 2016d; Samsung,
2016i) and stating consumers “raised questions” during the second recall, as opposed to
stating consumers experienced overheating and exploding devices (Samsung, 2016g), did
not paint Samsung to be a transparent and open company during this crisis.
The contrast between these vague terms and the online content circulating
describing and even showing videos of phones not “just overheating or melting down or
imploding – they were exploding like bombs” (Sullivan, 2016, para. 4) was stark. Media
reports demanded transparency and ownership regarding the overheating and exploding
phones. Following the second recall, Forbes questioned procedures in place, suggesting
Samsung revisit decisions that led to the same issue happening twice (Spence, 2016). The
article continued on to say “How the company reacted to the problem, how the recall was
implemented, and how the issues were communicated to the world should be questioned”
(Spence, 2016, para. 13). Forbes took issue with the communicative handlings of the
crisis from the very beginning; the immediate reaction, the recall protocol, as well as the
handlings of issues along the way, were not up to par (Spence, 2016). Quotes like these
further strengthen the notion that the media framed Samsung as not effectively handle the
crisis and that more transparency and communication would have improved perceptions
of the organization.
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The concept of multiple stakeholders could potentially inform Samsung’s lack of
transparency regarding the Galaxy Note 7 crisis. Once a global recall was necessary,
Samsung had to include suppliers, government agencies, retailers/distributors, and
consumers in order to pull all unsafe devices from the market while also answering for
why the crisis occurred in the first place. Involved government agencies included
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation
Administration, and International Air Transport Association (Selyukh, 2016; Spieler,
2016; Swartz, 2016). Involved retailers/distributors included Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile,
and Sprint (Kang, 2016). The question was, did Samsung really know what was going on
in order to offer stakeholders and media transparency? With the complexity of involved
parties including suppliers, government agencies, and retailers, confusion was at an alltime high as Samsung scrambled to determine the issue in what Koh described as “a tiny
problem in the manufacturing process” (Selyukh, 2016, para. 5).
Ambiguous instruction. While strategically ambiguous crisis responses can
potentially be effective (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Ulmer & Sellnow, 1997) Samsung’s
use of ambiguity did not improve the crisis. Ulmer and Sellnow (1997) offer the use of
ambiguity in crisis response when its use improves clarity regarding the crisis scenario.
Samsung’s use of ambiguity in crisis response did not benefit stakeholders in
interpretation of the crisis and offer improved clarity. Instead, the ambiguity reflected the
confusion Samsung experienced regarding the crisis and negatively impacted the clarity
of communication to stakeholders. Both organizational documents and media reports
demonstrated this theme throughout the crisis. Samsung’s first statement addressing the
faulty devices and announcing the temporary halt on sales advised customers who
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purchased the Galaxy Note 7 that Samsung would “voluntarily replace their current
device with a new one over the coming weeks” (Samsung, 2016b, para. 3). In this initial
statement Samsung did not insist consumers replace the device and was not clear
regarding the danger of the overheating phones. On that same day, in a separate
statement, Samsung offered the “availability of the U.S. Product Exchange Program for
Galaxy Note 7 owners” before mentioning there had “only been a small number of
reported incidents” (Samsung, 2016a, para. 1-2). The word “availability” and the
reminder of “a small number of reported incidents” does not necessarily stress whether or
not the exchange is mandatory, suggested, or just an option. Samsung did not place
urgency or concern on the announcements regarding the devices. In response to the
reports that replacement devices that were supposed to be “safe” were having the same
issues as the previous devices, Samsung responded by saying “If we conclude a safety
issue exits, we will work with CPSC to take immediate steps to address the situation”
offering stakeholders little direction regarding the safety of their new replacement
devices (Samsung, 2016g, para. 4).
Instructing information can communicate organizational control during a crisis to
stakeholders and benefit the organization’s reputation (Coombs, 2006). However, the
instructing information in the organizational documents on the various recalls
demonstrated a lack of clarity. After the first recall was established, the organization
released 8 statements that included instructions or details regarding how to participate in
the recall (Samsung 2016a; Samsung, 2016b; Samsung, 2016c; Samsung, 2016d;
Samsung, 2016e; Samsung, 2016f; Samsung, 2016h, Samsung, 2016j; Samsung, 2016L).
Samsung had to repeatedly offer instructing information to consumers while waiting for
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all unsafe devices to be returned. Each organizational statement was another reminder of
the crisis the organization was facing.
Mixed messages. Media reports reflect confusion regarding the recall protocol,
timeline for a fix, how safe the replacement devices truly were, and the severity of the
risk of using the device. From the first recall, The New York Times reported confusion
stating “It was unclear if Samsung would provide refunds for the Galaxy Note 7
customers who did not want a replacement by the company” (Kang, 2016, para. 10).
Other media sources report consumers struggling to go through the recall process
efficiently. NPR pointed to the “interchanging sales reps, bureaucratic intricacies and
unclear guidelines” as one customer attempted to exchange her faulty device (Selyukh,
2016, para. 2). The story went on to say “Alongside stories of completely smooth
transactions floating on Twitter, Reddit and Samsung forums are posts about lengthy
customer service calls, unnecessary store visits, demands of original boxes or accessories
and other hiccups” (Selyukh, 2016, para. 14). What was already a crisis, the
organization’s device overheating and exploding unpredictably, has now worsened as
consumers struggled to efficiently return their devices.
Just how severe the danger was of the device was also unclear. More than a week
after recommending consumers power down the Galaxy Note 7s, a formal recall was still
not issued and it was still legal to sell the devices (Selyukh, 2016). Lee and Lee (2016)
also commented on the “mixed messages” Samsung sent, recommending phones should
be shut off and not used, and days later stating a software fix had been created that
prevented batteries from overheating. Similarly, many stakeholders felt confused and
frustrated after the first global recall when after receiving what was supposed to be a
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fixed device, turned out to have the same risk of overheating and exploding as the first
Galaxy Note 7 (Oremus, 2016). BBC News well summarizes this frustration and
confusion regarding reassurances of safety from Samsung when they rehash the timeline
of the recalls in comparison to Samsung’s response:
In September, Samsung recalled around 2.5 million phones after complaints of
exploding batteries. It later insisted that all replaced devices were safe. However,
that was followed by reports that those phones were catching fire too. A Kentucky
man said he woke up to a bedroom full of smoke from a replaced Note 7, days
after a domestic flight in the US was evacuated after a new device started emitting
smoke in the cabin. Even as late as Monday evening, a spokeswoman insisted the
phones were safe to use. But on Tuesday, the company said it would stop Galaxy
Note 7 production (“Samsung permanently stops Galaxy Note 7 production”,
2016, para. 8).
Samsung’s lack of clarity regarding the crisis was evident to the publics as they
demanded clearer communication from the organization.
As noted, as the crisis progressed, Samsung did offer instructional information that
sought to help with confusion and clarify what information the organization was able to
clarify. These messages generally included updates via organizational documents
regarding what the organization was doing to ensure the consumers were safe and the
steps to participate in the recall with sources to go to if consumers needed further
explanation. Bulleted lists of instructions regarding options for those needing to replace
or exchange their devices were included at the end of statements (Samsung, 2016a;
Samsung, 2016d; Samsung, 2016j). Samsung also stated it was using multiple mediums
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of communication to reach a range of consumers who may not have heard about the
exchange. These mediums included “direct communications, customer service, social
media, marketing, and in-store communications” (Samsung, 2016j, para. 9).
Another example of clarifying information came after the first recall, when
consumers were encouraged to exchange the risky phones for the “safe” Galaxy Note 7s.
At this time, many consumers were confused how to tell if their device was safe or not. In
response, Samsung developed a software update which displayed a green battery icon to
indicate “consumers have a new Galaxy Note 7 with an unaffected battery” (Samsung,
2016e, para. 3). The organization also released informational videos and images once the
cause of the battery overheating was discovered to assist stakeholders in understanding
why phones were exploding. (Samsung, 2016e; Samsung, 2017b; Samsung, 2017c;
Samsung, 2017d).
“Unsafe” reputation. Another common theme throughout media reports was
concern regarding Samsung’s reputation as a result of the crisis. Reaction to the first
recall led Bloomberg Technology to report “This is creating an enormous problem for the
company – for its reputation and ability to support customers when there’s a problem”
(Lee & Lee, 2016). BBC News reported similar opinions following the second and final
global recall stating “The real issue is brand and reputation… the fact that Samsung
appeared to still be shipping defective devices could trigger a large loss of faith in
Samsung products” (“Samsung permanently stops Galaxy Note 7 production”, 2016,
para. 24). The New York Times put it most succinctly simply stating, “The Note 7 disaster
raised more doubt about Samsung’s reputation.” (Sang-Hun, 2016, para. 17). Although
the overheating and exploding device issue was directly linked to two separate supplier
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faults, and not a design factor that Samsung was responsible for, the crisis still negatively
impacted the organization’s reputation. Media reports took issue with a product as a
representation of Samsung that endangered consumers, regardless of the supplier being
at-fault.
When phones began overheating and exploding on airplanes, the Federal Aviation
Association, the International Air Transport Association, and The Department of
Transportation’s involvement eventually led to the banning of Galaxy Note 7s from
airplanes (Spieler, 2016; Sullivan, 2016, Swartz, 2016). The Department of
Transportation stated the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 was “considered a forbidden hazardous
material under the Federal Hazardous Material Regulations” and would not be allowed on
any flights (Selyukh, 2016, para. 1). Signs were placed at airports reminding flyers that
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 devices were not permitted on airplanes due to the explosive
potential of the device. Samsung lost control as messages regarding their devices were
placed prominently in airports around the world. Sullivan (2016) summarized the impact
of this ban of devices on Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 crisis when he stated:
The Samsung recall is a big one. It’s the first one I know of in which
announcements were made at airport gates that the device would not be allowed on
planes until they were powered down completely. All those public announcements
were like negative ads, and they were heard by hundreds of people (para. 8).
Consumer defiance. Once the first release of Galaxy Note 7 phones were
determined dangerous, millions of customers had already purchased the device. This
meant Samsung had to instruct millions of stakeholders how to participate in the recall
and exchange the device for a replacement phone, containing a battery from a new
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supplier, that was deemed safe. Following the first recall, the newly replaced “safe”
devices were determined unsafe and the Galaxy Note 7 was pulled from the market.
Samsung faced an even more challenging and risky quandary.
In order to end the crisis, Samsung ceased production of the Galaxy Note 7s and
attempted to remove all devices from the market. However, to do this Samsung was
dependent on the millions of Galaxy Note 7 consumers’ participation. Organizational
documents demonstrated that while many consumers willingly participated in order to rid
themselves of the unsafe device, Samsung struggled with the remaining 10% or so. 10%
of unreturned Galaxy Note 7s was not a small number considering the millions of people
who originally purchased the phone. Perhaps the remaining 10% who did not participate
did so out of lack of information, unclear as to how to exchange their device for a
different phone, or they simply did not care to take Samsung’s suggestion to return the
phone. Samsung was seemingly unsure as to why consumers were not responding when
the brand stated “For those not heeding [the] advice or are still not aware of the recall
notice, a software update will be pushed to all recalled devices” (Samsung, 2016e, para.
4). More important for supply chain crisis communication research than the reasoning
behind consumers not returning their device, is the cautionary lesson of how out of
control Samsung was during the Galaxy Note 7 crisis as the organization had to plead
with consumers to return devices. The time and money invested in the steps that had to be
taken to end the crisis outlined below, and the impact of this lack of control on
organizational reputation is important to note.
As of December, 9, 2016 almost two full months after Samsung’s October 10, 2016
notice of a global recall for all Galaxy Note 7 devices, Samsung was still missing 7% of
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the phones (Samsung, 2016L). By then, multiple software updates had already been
issued to encourage returns of the dangerous devices. These updates began after the first
recall and included the green battery icon to indicate a safe device (Samsung, 2016e) and
a safety notice “that [urged] owners to power down and exchange their recalled device”
each time the phone was turned on and off (Samsung, 2016e, para. 4). After the devices
were pulled off the market and Samsung was still struggling to reach 100% return,
Samsung implemented a software update, released on December 30, that prevented
Galaxy Note 7 devices from charging so that once the phone lost power, it was no longer
able to be used (Samsung, 2016L).
Samsung was forced to invest time and money to create and implement software
updates to make their phones inoperable to encourage consumers to return the dangerous
devices. Samsung was placed in a position of complete lack of control as consumers who
would not return the device of their own free will put the organization at risk of having to
answer for another exploding device. Consumers not returning devices kept the crisis
alive. Samsung had to continue to address the missing dangerous devices in
organizational statements in order to encourage consumers to return them, reminding
stakeholders of the exploding devices linked to Samsung’s brand.
Chapter Five: Conclusions
This paper used case study analysis to explore crisis response strategies and
attributions of responsibility in a supply chain crisis. Organizational documents and
media reports from Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 crisis were collected and analyzed to better
understand the unique communication challenges a supply chain crisis poses for an
organization.
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RQ1 (What communication strategies does the organization use during the supply
chain crisis to communicate with publics?) found that Samsung used all SCCT crisis
response strategies and did not cater crisis response strategies to the stakeholder
perspective. RQ2 (What are the stakeholder attributions of responsibility during the
supply chain crisis as seen through media reports?) and RQ3 (What are the organization’s
attributions of responsibility during the supply chain crisis as seen through organizational
documents?) found a dissonance between the attributions of responsibility that could
inform Samsung’s variety of crisis response strategy choices.
Thus, Samsung did not follow the guidelines presented by SCCT since their crisis
response strategies did not align with their stakeholder attributions of crisis responsibility.
Coombs (2006) states “The more responsibility stakeholders attribute to the organization
the more the crisis response strategy must seem to accept responsibility for the crisis” (p.
248). With media reports demonstrating high levels of attribution of responsibility, the
crisis response strategies chosen by the organization during the crisis with minimal
acceptance of responsibility, deny and diminish, did not align with stakeholder
expectations. Samsung also misused bolstering, placing it as a primary response strategy
and using it throughout the crisis. Bolstering offers a “minimal opportunity to develop
reputational assets” (Coombs, 2007, p. 172) and efforts could have been focused on
primary crisis response strategies that aligned with attributions of responsibility, as
opposed to bolstering, to repair reputational damage.
RQ4 (What challenges did Samsung experience during the supply chain crisis and
resulting recall as evidenced by the organizational documents and media reports?)
uncovered a variety of themes present during Samsung’s crisis related to supply chain
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challenges as well as communication challenges. As experienced as Samsung was with
managing a supply chain, the complexity of the global supply chain, risks of shared
suppliers, and industry pressures all contributed to the crisis. Meanwhile communication
challenges including a lack of transparency, ambiguous language, and mixed messages
contributed to the “unsafe” reputation and continued consumer defiance.
The complexity of suppliers challenged Samsung’s transparency as the
organization had to track down the fault in the supply chain while answering for the
overheating and exploding devices to the public. Once the phones began exploding and
had to be globally recalled, the stakeholders expanded to include government agencies,
retailers/distributors, and consumers on top of Samsung and its suppliers, which further
complicated communication and transparency.
Findings in this paper introduce challenges to traditional crisis response strategies
that do not account for dissonance between perceived and actual responsibility when
responding to supply chain crises. Challenges to traditional notions of reputation are also
introduced. While theorizations of reputation originally relied on the organization’s own
actions (Coombs, 2006; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Fombrun & van Riel, 2003; Newsom
et al., 2012), researchers such as Barnett and Hoffman (2008) and Veil et al. (2016)
began to expand the traditional notion of the organization being the only impacting factor
on its reputation. This paper further expands on this idea to include supply chain
members as affecting organizational reputation. Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 crisis
demonstrates that stakeholders will still hold the organization responsible if the end
product is faulty, even if it was the fault of a link in the supply chain. Supply chain
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members, thus, impact reputation and must be considered as part of the organizational
reputation.
Theoretical Implications
If Samsung had oriented themselves toward stakeholder perceptions, particularly
regarding attribution of responsibility, more appropriate crisis response strategies could
have been chosen. Samsung seemed disconnected in their organizational messages to
stakeholders based on media reports. Crisis scholars should caution organizations against
not attributing responsibility during a supply chain crisis. Coombs (2007) states
“Responsibility requires accountability and the organization must answer for its actions”
(p. 170). Samsung did not attribute responsibility in organizational documents and
seemingly did not answer for its actions. Media reports reflected frustration toward the
brand for not communicating clearly and not answering for the crisis at hand. In a supply
chain crisis, where actual and perceived levels of control and responsibility are more
skewed than traditional crises, organizations could benefit from a stakeholder oriented
perspective to attune to public perceptions of responsibility.
Another implication is for reputation management research. Suppliers have an
impact on the reputation of an organization and the potential to negatively impact an
organization’s reputation when a supply chain crisis occurs. This study demonstrates that
despite the level of control over an actual at-fault entity within the supply chain, the end
producer is always held responsible. While Samsung did not identify the suppliers at fault
in organizational documents, the media reports did. And yet, only Samsung was held
responsible for the crisis. Thus, this study suggests the reputational damage from a supply
chain crisis will fall on the end producer.
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Finally, research postulating the necessity of aligning crisis response strategies
with attributions of responsibility in order to benefit an organization during a crisis were
supported (Coombs, 1995; Coombs, 2006; Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2002;
Coombs & Holladay, 2006). Samsung’s attributions of responsibility and stakeholder
attributions of responsibility did not align and, as demonstrated in media reports, did not
improve organizational reputation. The “protective powers” that Coombs (2007) states
the correct crisis response strategy can offer for an organization’s reputation during a
crisis, were not received by Samsung as the misaligned strategies used by the
organization did not communicate an acceptance of appropriate responsibility to
stakeholders.
Practical Implications
This study demonstrates the need for closer examination of supply chain network
challenges and supply chain crises. As The Wall Street Journal aptly stated, Samsung’s
supply chain crisis placed “a spotlight on supply-chain oversight and raising questions
about the ability of today’s technology and management tools to help companies maintain
quality control in giant complex networks of suppliers” (Loten & Norton, 2016, para. 1).
Even Samsung, a noted expert in supply chain management, faced multiple breaks in
their supply chain and a severe supply chain crisis. As use of supply chains increases,
supply chain managers should remain cognizant of the risks inherent to supply chain
reliance. Organizations must further examine complexities of supply chain management
and supply chain crisis management to most effectively manage supply chains and
prepare for potential crises.
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Another practical implication for crisis managers and organizations with a supply
chain is to understand that reliance on a supply chain lessens organizational control. The
more complex the supply chain, the more difficult supply chain management of
individual suppliers and the supply chain as a whole becomes. For Samsung, control was
originally decreased by their reliance on a global supply chain, further decreased as
multiple outer organizations became involved in the recall, and reached an all-time low
once the brand was reliant on all consumers returning Galaxy Note 7 devices in order to
end the crisis.
This study also poses the question of how transparent organizations should be
regarding their supply chain. Organizations could be more transparent about both supply
chain reliance and the suppliers within the chain. With greater transparency of suppliers
and supply chain reliance, stakeholders could have a greater awareness regarding supply
chain complexities. If awareness is increased, in the event of a crisis, the break in the
supply chain could be identified and more easily understood by stakeholders to be the atfault party, as opposed to holding the organization solely responsible.
Finally, while management researchers delve into the fields of supply chain
management and risk management to best serve the unique needs of supply chains, so too
should communication researchers. As internal measures are implemented to prevent and
alleviate supply chain risks, external measures such as employing supply chain crisis
managers, trained specifically to address the unique risks of supply chain crises, should
be implemented as well.
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Limitations and Future Research
This study was conducted as an exploratory study to begin the process of supply
chain crisis research through examination of one supply chain crisis. Samsung’s Galaxy
Note 7 crisis was chosen for its recency, newsworthiness, and unique instance of having
two separate supplier failures in the same crisis. Future research should examine a range
of supply chain crises to explore potential differences in crisis response and management
based on factors such as industry, severity, location, etc.
The data collected in this research focuses on external communication through
examination of organizational documents and media reports. While these documents
offer insight into both organizational handlings and media perceptions, future research
could delve into the internal communications of an organization facing a supply chain
crisis to offer insight as to why certain response strategies are chosen. For example,
interviews with communication directors at organizations that have experienced a supply
chain crisis could offer more rich data regarding supply chain crisis management than
organizational documents alone can show. Future research could also delve more
thoroughly into stakeholder perceptions through social media analysis.
In conclusion, this thesis contributes to the crisis communication research
literature by introducing a previously unstudied type of crisis, a supply chain crisis.
Organizations are increasingly relying on supply chains (Natarajarathinam et al., 2009)
and thus demand further research into the unique elements of this type of crisis. This
study found that the complexity inherent to supply chain crises brings into question
shared accountability and its impact on organizational responsibility, control, reputation
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and response during a crisis. Future studies should delve further into this type of crisis to
examine appropriate communication strategies when answering for a supply chain crisis.
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Appendix A: Media Reports and Organizational Documents
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